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Foreword
Soon after the National Academy of Public Administration was activated
in the Fall of 1967, it initiated a seminar series dealing with current problems
of the management and organization of NASA. The seminar was one of the initial
projects undertaken in connection with a three year contract between NASA and
the Academy. The 1967-68 reorganization of the space agency was a major focus of
the seminar, though its total range was not limited to this event.
The seminar was designed to provide a comparative basis for understand-
ing such recurring problems as delegation of authorlty, resource allocation and
decision-making patterns, headquarters organization, systems of program control
and evaluation, roles and relations of scientists, engineers and administrators,
Headquarters-field center relationships, and the overall management philosophy of
the Headquarters and the field centers.
A series of 11 monthly meetings were held. Two of the early meetings
were focused on the organization and management problems of other agencies (the
Office of Price Administration and the Federal Aviation Agency) to help develop
deeper insight and understanding concerning such problems and to relate past ex-
perience to the NASA situation. Subsequent meetings were devoted to the 1967-68
NASA reorganization, in particular, and to matters of NASA management and organ-
ization, in general. Twenty-six persons participated in the seminar. Seventeen
were senior officials from NASA, five were senior executives from other federal
agencies, and four were public administration scholars. The names and titles of
the participants are listed in Appendix A.
The NASA record of accomplishment is far-ranging. It encompasses both
aeronautics and space and, in the latter area, both manned and unmanned exploration.
!
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The manned exploration program has always received the greatest attention because
of the spectacular nature of the technological challenges involved. With the suc-
cess of Apollo 11 in July 1969, NASA won worldwide recognition for the combination
of technical and managerial skills needed for the complex and difficult task of
landing men on the moon and returning them safely to earth. The technical exper-
ience gained in the Apollo missions provided a record which could be captured from
technical documentation and transferred to future technical undertakings. The
counterpart task of analyzing and distilling the learning experience in the area
of organization and management proved a much less straightforward matter and one
which was open to various interpretations. Although the Apollo Management System
has subsequently been codified and disseminated for application within NASA, the
broader subject of the overall organization and management of the national space
program has yet to be analyzed and reported systematically.
The manuscript which follows is based primarily upon the discussions
in 11 meetings, supplemented by additional interviewing and data collection as
required. It attempts to distill from the 850 pages of transcript the major issues
and concerns discussed. It also seeks to pinpoint the most important factors which
contributed to the successes of NASA and to identify some of the central problems
faced by the agency in the late 1960's.
August 1972 Roy W. Crawley
Erasmus H. Kloman
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Chapter 1
The Reorganizations of 1961, 1963, and 1965
NASA was created as the result of many months of study as to how the
United States could best respond to the challenge of Russia's Sputnik I. The
formation of the space agency was, in large measure, a response to the national
concern about a possible shift in scientific, technical, and educational
leadership to the U.S.S.R. At the outset, NASA faced the enormous tasks of
implementing new national goals with far-reaching economic, political,
psychological, and administrative effects, new and highly complex technological
responsibilities, and the selection and development of personnel for tasks never
before performed.
As NASA evolved and matured, experimentation and change in structure
and process were essential. Its administrative history is characterized by
reorganization, a period of adjustment and adaptation, and then reorganization once
again.
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which established NASA,
permitted such flexibility. It specified that:
The Administration shall be headed by an Administrator, who
shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Under the
supervision and direction of the President, the Administrator
shall be responsible for the exercise of all power and the
discharge of all duties of the Administration, and shall have
authority and control over all personnel and activities thereof...l
Only one other Presidential appointee -- the Deputy Administrator -- was provided
for in the Act. The Act provided that the Deputy Administrator "shall perform
such duties and exercise such power as the Administrator may prescribe. The
1. National Aeronautics and Space Act, HR 12575, S 3609, 85th Congress,
2nd Session, 1958.
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Deputy Administrator shall act for, and exercise the power of, the Administrator
during his absence or disability." The Administrator, therefore, has the authority
and the responsibility to define the organization and the management principles,
policies, and practices to be followed in the space program.
The first NASA Administrator, T. Keith Glennan, had the task of assem-
bling and reordering the many diverse elements that were pulled together under
the provisions of the 1958 Act. NASA's first official structure and relationships
were established in January, 1959, and most of that year was devoted to launching
the agency. A major organizational change took place at the end of 1959 with the
transfer of the Saturn program, and the associated Army installation at Huntsville,
Alabama, to NASA. The year of 1960 was a period of integration of the Huntsville
activity, transfer of other facilities from the military services to NASA, and
concentration on strengthening the internal management of the agency.
After two and a half years Glennan was succeeded by James E. Webb who
served as NASA Administrator for eight years. Under his administration the agency
geared up for the Apollo program and conducted the missions leading up to the
first manned landing. As ensuing discussion will reveal, Webb's management phil-
osophy was to exercise a substantial influence on the organization and administra-
tion of the agency.
Webb deliberately employed fairly frequent organizational restructuring
in an effort to maintain management initiative and organization vitality. In this
connection, Webb noted:
Thus, one of the fundamental principles of the management of
NASA has been flexibility, both from the standpoint of the
duties of individuals and of organizational structure. NASA
had the task of achieving difficult, yet clear and unambiguous
goals within an environment of very rapidly advancing technology.
We did not hesitate to make the necessary organizational changes
whenever they were needed to facilitate our work. As might be
expected, this rather frequent use of organizational restructur-
ing as an element of our leadership placed severe demands on us
-5-
and upon our executives. They had to retain flexibility within
their current assignments and be willing to shift to new posi-
tions. We, in turn, had to personally evaluate a large amount
of "feedback"2
Leadership. The choice of James E. Webb to serve as Administrator of
NASA in 1961 reflected his strong political support by key members of Congress
and Vice President Johnson. Webb's background also corresponded with
President Kennedy's preference for a tried and proved administrator, who understood
the political system and process, rather than a technical man for this post.
Webb's previous experience as Director of the Budget, Under Secretary of State,
and in a large number of other activities in both the public and private sector
h-ad exposed him to the intricacies of the political processes in Washington
and he had developed a high capability for operating within those processes.
Webb brought to his new assignment a keen awareness of the importance of an
agency head's relationships with the President and the Congress. With respect
to the White House, he was convinced of the importance of direct access to the
President without allowing communications to be controlled by intermediaries
on the White House staff. Webb's previous close relationship with the White
House and the commitment of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to the goals of the
space program helped to assure the highest level political support during the
pre-Apollo years. Webb also had gained extensive experience in dealing with
Congress. He had observed the tendency among Congressional committees to put
constraints upon agencies -which appeared to be building centers of power. He
recognized the importance of maintaining effective liaison with Congress, and
2. NASA, Preliminary History of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Foreword -- pp. vii-viii, January 15, 1969.
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his prior experience had equipped him with the personal contacts and political
awareness essential to such liaison.
In addition to his extensive experience in dealing with the top
levels of both the executive and legislative branches of the federal government,
Webb had built a record as an administrator with an understanding of organi-
zation and management. He brought to NASA some strong personal convictions about
how an agency should be administered. Having served on the first Hoover Commis-
sion and later as Under Secretary of State, with the responsibility for putting
into effect the Commission's recommendations concerning the Department, Webb
took up his NASA duties with the conviction that it was necessary to develop
"a sound basis of theory and doctrine" in administration before proceeding to
action programs. At the beginning of his administration of NASA, Webb devoted
a good deal of time and attention to "theoretical and doctrinal constructs and
concepts." He sought to determine the level of sophistication of his principal
associates in the application of such concepts in order to see how top manage-
ment in NASA could best work together. In emphasizing a philosophy of management
and a rationale for administration, Webb was moving counter to those elements
in the agency which favored concentration of effort on "Making the birds fly"
without concern for the administrative framework within which they operated.
He felt that it was necessary to establish a sound organizational base which
would permit effective decision-making over a long-range period and on a
comprehensive basis.
Webb reorganized NASA on four occasions -- in 1961, 1963, 1965, and
1967/68. All four reorganizations primarily affected NASA Headquarters. The
1961 and 1963 reorganizations were concerned with the reporting chain of the
field centers to the Headquarters. The 1965 reorganization resulted from
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Dryden's death which ended the troika that had performed so effectively. The
1967/68 reorganization, and related events, were part of a continuing effort
to find effective new patterns of management leadership for the space program.
The 1961 Reorganization. The first reorganization was designed
to accomodate the 1961 policy decisions which resulted in accelerating
greatly the NASA program -- the national goal of a manned lunar landing by the
end of the decade and the development of nuclear powered rocket capability,
communications satellites, and meteorological satellites. The accelerated
program led to an analysis of the adequacy of the NASA organization to cope
with the program. The result of the analysis was a major reorganization, in
November 1961, that was designed to clarify and strengthen the role of top
management and to prevent the development of autonomous bureaus. A general
manager for the agency was created, a "functional management" 3 concept of
line-staff relationships was initiated, the Readquarters program offices were
realigned in terms of program objectives, and the field centers, which formerly
had reported to the various Headquarters program offices, were made directly
responsible to the general manager, the Associate Administrator.
The following year -- 1962 -- represented a period of rapid growth in
funding levels, personnel, and procurements as well as adjustments to the
November 1961 reorganization. During the year, it became apparent that the
1961 reorganization was not working as effectivelyas had been hoped because
of difficulties faced by field center directors in balancing the program
demands placed upon them by the Headquarters program offices, which were
responsible for program goals and performance, with the resources provided by top
management. A chart of the revised organization appears at Exhibit One.
3. The concept of functional management is described in the following
section on the 1963 reorganization. More detailed discussions of NASA management
concepts appear in Chapters 3 and 4.
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The 1963 Reorganization. The year of 1963 was a time of great debate
over NASA's mission, a changing pattern of external support, a leveling off
of the agency's budget, and a growing awareness of the inadequacies of the 1961
reorganization. One result of these forces was a reorganization, in November
1963, which reversed the provision of the 1961 reorganization that placed the
field centers under the general manager. In effect, this reorganization
recombined program and institutional management by placing the centers under
the Headquarters program offices, thereby facilitating decision-making at
lower organizational levels and emphasizing simplified command lines. A
chart of this reorganization appears at Exhibit Two.
In addition, the 1963 reorganization placed increased emphasis upon
the "functional management" concept which was designed to balance and round out the
authorities incorporated in the line structure by the assignment of broadened
responsibilities to the Headquarters offices.
Functional managers in such areas as procurement, personnel, resource
control, and other administrative specialities were called upon to play a
stronger role than that of merely furnishing staff advice to line officials.
Functional managers were charged with the broad responsibilities of observing
and evaluating the manner in which their functions were being performed through-
out NASA and insuring that functional needs were met in a way that accomplished
institutional as well as program objectives and was consistent with policy
and sound practice. In effect, decisions were perceived as inadequate if they
failed to take into account the functional and administrative requirements
of the agency as defined by law, regulation, management policy, or the dictates
of sound management practices. Functional managers were expected to define
these requirements, and line managers were expected to give the requirements
full consideration in shaping their own decisions at every level in the
- 10 -
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organization. Under this concept, functional managers had two bosses, since
they had to be supportive of line officials while assuring top management that
every decision was based on a balanced judgment which reflected administrative
needs and constraints as well as program requirements.
Webb expressed the concept as follows:
Functional management, as we perceive it, is a means of
optimizing administrative specialization, while, at the
same time, retaining the essential ingredients of tradi-
tional line management concepts. It is an effort to cope
with the persistent problems we have in modern complex
organizations of solving the dilemma between hierarchy
and specialization.4
Although these changes directly affected the individual relation-
ships between the top staff of the centers and their Headquarters counterparts,
the effect upon the vast majority of center personnel and the manner in which
they carried out their day-to-day operations was a good deal less substantial.
The field centers have continued throughout the lifetime of NASA to maintain
their separate existences, their own styles of management, and, to a greater
or lesser degree, their own momentum. As one of the seminar participants
observed: "The amount of control you exert centrally can squelch the
decentralized groups completely and kill off initiative and authority."
The period from 1964 through November 1965 was a time of relative
organizational stability. The pattern of Headquarters-field center relation-
ships continued unchanged. The top-level collegial approach -- Administrator
Webb, Deputy Administrator Dryden, and Associate Administrator Seamans --
to the overall management of the agency proved to be highly effective. It
appeared that the agency had shaken down in terms of organization and programs
and that the management and execution of its accelerated programs would consti-
tute the major tasks.
4. James E. Webb, Administration and the Conquest of Space, Conference
of the American Society for Public Administration, Detroit, Michigan, April le, 1962.
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End of'the Troika and the 1965 Reorganization. In late 1965, Dryden
died, thus ending the highly successful troika and setting in motion a search
for effective, new leadership patterns that was to continue for several years.
The initial step in this process was to appoint Seamans as Deputy Administrator
while continuing his responsibilities as general manager for operations. In
effect, Seamans assumed Dryden's former responsibilities in addition to those
that Seamans had been performing. A revised organizational structure for NASA
Headquarters was established in December 1965 (See Exhibit III). This
reorganization created an Office of the Administrator with the following
operational pattern:
...delegations of authority and responsibility to the Deputy
Administrator to enable him to serve on a day-to-day basis
as general manager of the agency and to serve as Acting
Administrator in the absence of the Administrator...These
delegations to the Deputy Administrator will be complete, and
it is expected that he will, on a day-to-day basis, take
final action on most matters, except where there are legal
or special requirements that necessitate personal action by
the Administrator.-
In a memorandum of December 29, 1965, to the "Heads of All Headquarters
Offices and Directors of Field Center," Webb, in amplification of the changed
responsibilities, stated:
As Administrator, it will be my purpose to rely fully and
completely on Dr. Seamans, as general manager, to conduct
the affairs of the Agency in conformance with both agency
and governmental requirements and in accord with the broader
context within which we must operate. He will keep me fully
informed, as I will him. On policy and actions having more
than ordinary implications, we will, whenever possible,
consult together before either takes action. The Associate
Administrators in charge of Program Offices, both individ-
ually and collectively, will be encouraged to prepare for
and undertake more of the NASA-wide responsibilities of
general management under the direction of the Deputy Admin-
istrator.
5. NASA, Preliminary History of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Chapter VI, pp. 12, January 15, 1969.
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-- There will be continued emphasis on the development of
workable patterns of strong NASA-wide functional coordina-
tion and supervision of those elements of policy and admin-
istration which can be fully effective only if an acceptable
degree of NASA-wide coherence and consistency is achieved.
All functional staff offices will report to the Deputy
Administrator. Together, they will constitute a single central
functional staff serving the Office of the Administrator and
also serving the Associate Administrators in charge of program
offices to the fullest extent possible.
The 1965 reorganization, in addition, defined the functions of the
Secretariat, headed by the Executive Secretary, as assuring effective
communications throughout NASA, insuring that proper coordination has been
provided and policy accurately reflected in matters coming to the Office of
the Administrator, expediting and scheduling the flow of work in that office,
and providing central reference and office services in the Office of the
Administrator.
Dryden's death left a serious gap in NASA leadership. His absence
was felt most acutely at senior levels of administration where he had served
as an arbiter in the complex decision-making process on matters of scientific
and technological content. No other individual could be found who combined
all of the information and knowledge which had permitted Dryden to provide
the kinds of judgments and counsel he had offered up until his death.
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Chapter 2
The 1967 - 68 Reorganization
At about the same time that Dryden's death brought the troika to
an end, the nature and scope of the concerns of NASA senior management began
to undergo significant change. Increasing attentionhad to be focused on
the broad questions pertaining to the future of the space program. Many of
the new issues involved considerations external to NASA and beyond the agency's
control.
Rationale. For NASA, 1967 was a year of highly significant, even
traumatic events. The search for an effective alternate leadership pattern
to the troika continued, the Apollo 204 fire occurred, Seamans resigned as
Deputy Administrator and general manager of operations, and Newell (former
Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications) was elevated to
the revised position of Associate Administrator.
On January 6, 1967, a special task force was appointed to analyze
and strengthen NASA's organizational structure. Three weeks later, January 21,
1967, the Apollo 204 fire occurred at the Kennedy Space Center. The subsequent
report of the Apollo 204 Review Board,6 and the task force study resulted in
a number of measures aimed at improving both the technical and the management
6. The complete documentation of the investigation of the Review
Board has been impounded for ten years.
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aspects of the space program. In essence. these measures were aimed at
preventing future problems of a potentially serious nature by insuring that
the "self-policing" features of NASA's organization as well as those elements of
the overall management system designed to provide advanced warning of potential
problems were functioning effectively and were providing the required visibility
to all levels of NASA management. The 1967-68 reorganization stretched out over
a period of about a year and a half. At the conclusion of this process the
agency had assumed the new organizational pattern illustrated at Exhibit Four.
Office of Organization and Management. A major step, designed to
upgrade the management of NASA, was the establishment, in March 1967, of an
Office of Organization and Management under an Associate Administrator. This
Office brought together a number of previously separate offices concerned
with various facets of NASA management -- administration, industry affairs,
technology utilization, and university affairs. It represented a more
integrated structure of functional and administrative offices and provided a
stronger focus for effective management and for assuring the balance necessary
for overall decision-making.
The Associate Administrator for Organization and Management was
made responsible for the development and implementation of major mechanisms
for agency review and approval of management actions0and resources. He was
expected to ensure that: (1) decisions reached through such processes repre-
sented the best balance of judgment of line management needs and functional
administrative needs; (2) agency policies and practices were followed; and,
(3) the requirements of external entities -- Congress, General Accounting Office,
Bureau of the Budget (now Office of Management and Budget), Civil Service
Commission, etc., -- were understood and recognized. The underlying concept
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for the Office of Organization and Management was perceived as one of management
"checks and balances," but the emphasis in the activities of the Office was
to be placed upon complete and well rounded decisions, both for the present
and the future.
In addition, the Associate Administrator for Organization and
Management was assigned major responsibilities in personnel management. Webb,
in describing this role, stated that this Associate Administrator:
... works closely with the Administrator to emphasize that,
in NASA as an R & D organization subject to tendencies
to relegate administration to a secondary position, all senior
officials must accept responsibility for developing improved
means for judging the administrative performance of
subordinate officials; develops criteria for selection upward
of R & D personnel who also demonstrate administrative compe-
tence and the transfer to non-administrative specialities
of those who cannot grow in both program and administrative
areas.
Realignment of Senior Administration. In September, 1967, Seamans
announced his intention to resign as Deputy Administrator and general manager
of operations at the end of the year. This decision meant that a new set of
top management relationships had to be created which would continue the effort
to improve top leadership and management and would provide for effective
,allocation of the workload and responsibilities of Seamans.
Several actions were taken in late 1967 in an effort to strengthen
NASA management. To expedite the process of policy definition and dissemination,
an Office-of Management Development, headed by an Assistant Administrator, was
created to take the lead in developing agency policies, procedures, responsibil-
ities, and authorities. Vice Admiral Charles E. Waakley, USN (Ret.), was
appointed to the post.
7. NASA Management Issuance 1130.1, Subject: "Roles and Responsibilities --
The Associate Administrator for Organization and Management."
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In December, 1967, the Headquarters offices concerned primarily
with external relationships -- international affairs, legislative affairs,
public affairs, etc. -- were brought together under the direction of Willis
Shapley, Associate Deputy Administrator, and the activities of the office dealing
with DOT relationships were expanded to include relationships with other federal
agencies.
In addition, Homer Newell, then Associate Administrator for Space
Science and Applications, was elevated to the revised position of Associate
Administrator. Webb assigned Newell, in this new role, the initial task of
identifying the key elements in the NASA management philosophy and applying
these concepts in the development of a sound system of organization and
administration for the second decade of the space program. Newell, after
several months of analysis, formulated a set of management "principles" and
organizational proposals.8 In the process of conducting this analysis,
Newell identified a number of problems and deficiencies in the management
and organization of NASA. He then attempted to relate the management "principles"
he identified to alleviating these underlying problems. The "principles",
underlying problems, and organizational remedies were discussed at length in
the seminar.
The "Principles". Newell's analysis of the underlying problems of
NASA organization and management resulted in the formulation of the following
nine management "principles."
1. Cohesion. The organization should be structured and used so as to bring
its elements together rather than divide them. The Management Council, to be
described later, is an example of an organizational device calculated to bring
8. Notes for National Academy of Public Administration Seminar,
"Management Principles Bearing on NASA Organization and Management," October 1968.
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the programh offices together so as to counter divisive tendencies. The
application of this principle will become more evident in connection with
other principles developed below.
2. Participation. The organization should operate so that its various
elements are represented in fact-finding and discussion where their interests
are concerned and/or where they have a contribution to make. This does not
mean that unanimity is required to reach decisions or that a majority should
rule. There should be no attenuation of responsibility for decision-making or
leadership at various management levels. However, management should exercise
its leadership and reach its decisions through a time-limited process of
fact-finding and consideration which utilizes both participative and
consultative techniques.
3. Structure. The organization should be structured so as to provide a good
match to the agency's goals and objectives. Inasmuch as major objectives
change with time, the agency must be willing to change its organization from
time to time to adapt to new circumstances and needs. On the other hand
change must not be too frequent; a reorganization should be designed to be
viable and effective for a sufficient period of time to foster a sense of
stability, purpose, and direction.
4. Dynamism. Both the structure and the operations of the agency should
consciously aim at preserving dynamism, or freshness in spirit and action.
This is a matter of vitality rather than change per se. Change alone does
not create vitality, though it is ofteniconfused with and may indeed retard it.
A readiness to change to correct deficiencies or achieve new goals is, however,
essential to dynamism. Other factors which can contribute to vitality are
the choice of challenging but achievable objectives, delegation of responsibility,
- ZU -
proper supervision, leeway to experiment at lower levels, opportunity to create,
adequate but minimal structure and process, and ready reward for performance.
5. Open Decision-Making. Decision-making at all levels should be based on
consideration of all relevant factors. To the extent that it is compatible with
available time and appropriate substance, there should be open discussion of
these factors and of the alternatives available to management. This is not only
consistent with the other principles listed here, but will serve to strengthen
their application.
6. Self-Policing. To the extent that it is consistent with economy, expedition,
morale, and the clear assignment of responsibility, the organization should be
structured so as to provide for checks and balances. If properly done, this
is in the interests of both the agency and the individual. There is, however,
a delicate line between constructive and destructive checks and balances.
Useful "conflict" can be achieved through structured discussion among peers,
through fact-finding techniques, and through adequate supervision. These devices
are greatly to be preferred to "conflict" generated by duplicating or overlapping
action or line assignments. Thus, a Management Council provides constructive
checks upon the planning and performance of program administrators; the
grouping of external functions under a single head provides constructive checks
upon each of the external function administrators; and NASA's source evaluation
technique protects the agency when properly applied in difficult decision-
making. Duplicate assignments to study, analyze, review, or recommend can be
very useful if structured to preclude misunderstanding and surprise. On the
other hand, where operational responsibility is involved, as in action or line
management assignments, duplicate assignments can be devastating, tending to
- 21 -
confuse responsibility, introduce divisiveness, attack morale, increase
confusion inside and outside the agency, and increase the work on some items
while dropping others between the'cracks.
7. Scope and'Limits'for Expertise. Adequate scope and authority should be
given to both program and staff office expertise. Internally, this question
has been greatly clarified by the Administrator's strong emphasis upon
functional staff responsibilities. Externally, a working partnership should
apply. Where both program and staff representation is required externally,
each should speak to its peculiar subject matter within the ranking framework
of the agency's structure. Prior coordination should be necessary before
speaking for an area outside a representative's expertise. The principle
of constituencies or clientele is also helpful in sorting out the proper
relationship of programmatic and functional responsibilities; each should respect
the communications lines required by the other in day-to-day activities. These
considerations will best serve the agency's interests in dealing both internally
and externally.
8. Constituency or Clientele. In establishing proper relationships among
programmatic and functional responsibilities, each program and staff office
should respect the communication lines required by the other in day-to-day
activities. Each should keep the other informed, bring the other in on appro-
priate matters, and arrange for the official with the responsibility to carry
out the representation function; wherever possible.
9. Economy of Effort. Most of the above principles can be served through a
broad gauged effort to conserve energy for the main purpose. In other words,
to minimize overlap, avoid undue conflict, ensure maximum job effectiveness and
satisfaction, and increase overall organic efficiency. A conscious attempt
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should be made to request only that effort which will be used and to use the
effort that is requested. This implies diligent staff work and imposes on
management a requirement for guidance and review comparable to the requirement
upon other levels for implementation. Adherence to the next five sub-principles
will contribute to achieving economy of effort.
a. Guided Staff Work. Adequate instructions to staff, and time
devoted in advance to understanding the purpose and scope of an assignment, will
reduce the amount of wasted effort, increase understanding between levels of
management, and improve the quality, quantity, and usefulness of staff work.
b. 'Action-Orientation. The organization should cultivate the
practice of moving out with administrative actions which are adequate in
substance, even if on an interim basis only, rather than delaying action in
order to polish and re-polish. Experience is a better polisher, in any case,
than extended debate prior to experience. Unduly protracted consideration
gluts the decision-making process and depresses the level of staff expectations
and confidence.
c. Focus. The use, assignment, and development of individuals should
more often be focussed than diffused. It is important to involve selected
personnel in varied assignments calculated to develop their capacities and
experience, but careful consideration must be given at the same time to the
personal and agency stake in continuity and focus.
d. Clustering. The grouping of related functions is another important
device for achieving focus, enhanced strength, and economy.
e. Quality of Staff. Management should give attention to acquiring,
developing, and maintaining a high quality staff, and to properly placing and
using personnel.
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The Underlying Problems. In describing the above principles, Newell
stated that they had been formulated, not as an abstraction of something that
is good inherently and so should be followed, but rather in response to a
problem that NASA had confronted in the past or faced at present. In
formulating the principles, therefore, an approach to resolving the problem
or the problems is implied. To illustrate this relationship between principle
and problem, Newell remarked that the first principle -- Cohesion -- was
derived from the pattern developed during the early years of NASA which tended,
both organizationally and in operating practice, to divide the agency. The
agency had a tight, neat division into science and application, into technology,
into manned space flight, etc. That organization tended to separate programs
and staff and to make coordination and integration difficult. Moreover, the
processes for program review and decision-making tended to enforce that decision.
Status reviews were conducted for each program individually with no involvement
of officials from other programs. It was almost as though top management was
sending signals down through the organization saying, "Don't bother with each
other." This impression was enhanced by the fact that not only was the review
process carried on in that manner but even the decision process was. Program
directors reviewed programs and projects with the general manager who would
then make decisions. Program directors were given little opportunity to
debate, in open forum, the pros and cons of what each of them was proposing
versus what the others were proposing or the allocation of resources to various
programs.
The Open Decision-Making principle stemmed from the fact that, in
the past, program officials felt that some of the hidden staff operations --
and there were many of them -- had the power of pocket veto. In other words,
there were functional staff groups so placed in NASA that, although they were
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not in the decision-making stream, program matters had to go through them. As
a result, just by taking undue time in the review process or by saying certain
things in secret to the general manager, they could stop progress and it became
an interminable effort to find out what was going on. There was a tendency for
a variety of decisions to be made in little conclaves without consideration
of all the factors in an open forum where the give and take of their relative
values were considered. Decisions were made in areas for which program directors
had responsibility but without their participation in the decision-making process.
A participant observed that this situation was not perceived by top management
as harmful to program directors. He felt that, if it had been so perceived by
top management, the process would have been changed. A second participant
remarked that there are prerogatives of the commander or of the executive to
make a decision at some point whether or not it pleases everyone. After a
reasonable amount of consultation, the organization has to accept a decision
which may not always be equally comfortable to everybody. Another participant
responded by noting that the central point is that, if the consultation is
genuine and timely, then it is not damaging. If it is perfunctory or pro forma
or not real, then it is damaging. And program officials in NASA regarded the
process as of the latter type.
The Dynamism principle derived from what seemed to be a change in
flavor, a change in spirit in the organization due, perhaps, to a combination
of factors -- the effects of the war in Viet Nam, declining support and resources,
and the fact that many of the programs agreed upon in the first round of setting
objectives were still in process. Seamans, before he left NASA, became disturbed
because he found that some of thel centers were telling him they could not
perform this task or carry out that program. He commented: "This is backwards.
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The normal pattern is for the center to drag Headquarters along and for
Headquarters to hold the centers somewhat in check. That is the way it should
be with the centers way out ahead and pulling Headquarters along. Something
is wrong when the centers indicate they cannot undertake a new program, they
have enough to do, and want to be left alone." A participant commented that the
centers had been operating in a climate in which the Voyager program was
eliminated and in which it was not permissable even to think about a manned
planetary program. With such a climate, it seemed a waste of effort to be
imaginative. All the pressures were at work to cause the centers to become
conservative. Another participant remarked that NASA formerly had a balanced
program that greatly extended staff capability over a period of five years or
so into the future. At present, the program consists of undertaking projects
that are easily within staff capability and one which has dropped out all
future activities. A third participant observed that there is some force that
becomes operative after seven or eight years of organizational life which
generates within the organization an approach of conservatism and makes it
easy to rationalize resource restraints and other limitations. As a record of
accomplishment is built, the tendency is to look back at that record and not
at where you ought to be going. In addition, you learn what you cannot do
readily and so tend toward conservatism. Also, a legislative history
accumulates and constitutes a restraint. Other operative factors include an
over preoccupation with documentation, of being able to prove that the right
decisions were made all through the process, and of being able to justify
actions to GAO. The average age of staff increases and the process of renewal
and rejuvenation becomes much more difficult. Another participant commented
that the problem is that people become institutionalized around specific
&/
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programs and it becomes extremely difficult to change the institution, because
vested interests have developed.
The Self-Policing principle stemmed from the fact that there was
a tendency to apply the inspection-type, Gestapo approach to activities that
many people felt could be better treated by effective use of organizational
autonomy and proper processes. In the check-and-balance system developed within
NASA, there was a process of pulling up inputs from program offices, turning
them over to another group, and having that group review the programs to make
certain the program directors were not withholding information or slanting
data, and then feeding the results of the review to the general manager. The
analysis did not go back via the program office and there often was a surprise
confrontation when the final decision was announced. There was, in essence,
considerable confusion over information-gathering for intelligence purposes
and the manner in which the information was used. The problem was that, when
information had to be gathered, there was a group off to the side that was
given the task of collecting the data and feeding it into the top decision-
maker. The line organization was left in the dark as to what was going on. And
this damaged the agency since it was the line organization that had the knowledge,
expertise, and ability to gather the appropriate data and to make it available.
The process followed meant that the senior decision-maker abdicated his respon-
sibilities by becoming a prisoner of his staff and the staff made decisions
that should have been made by the line operators and without an input from the
line. A participant remarked that this conflict between representativeness
and checks and balances is one of the great paradoxes of all advanced western
societies. If representativeness is emphasized, everyone gets into the act.
If you stress checks and balances, the results seem totalitarian. This is a
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key problem in public agencies at all levels. It is a cultural problem that
permeates the society. No one knows how to do it. Another participant
remarked that there is no formula for resolving the conflict. But he noted
that, when it is solved on a day-to-day basis, a high degree of efficiency
is achieved.
The Organizational Remedies. To help resolve the problems described
in the previous section, Newell recommended, and obtained approval for, the
establishment of a Management Council and a Planning System.
The Management Council, as conceived by Newell, was to be an integral
element of NASA's overall management and organizational structure. Its
membership was to include the Associate Administrator (chairman), the General
Counsel, the Associate Deputy Administrator, and the Associate Administrators for
Advanced Research and Technology, Manned Space Flight, Organization and Manage-
ment, Space Science and Applications, and Tracking and Data Acquisition. The
Administrator and Deputy Administrator were to serve as ad hoc members.
All NASA officials reporting directly to the Administrator were
expected to be full participants in the total management process rather than
being concerned primarily only in managing and promoting programs and activities
for which they had line responsibility. Thus, there was to be an organic
element designed to draw elements of the agency together and to provide a forum
where major decisions of the agency were based on the best thinking and reasoned
judgment of the agency as represented by the Council.
The Council was to hold half-day meetings routinely once a week,
expanding these meetings each month into an all-day session designated as a
General Management Review. Additional meetings were to be held at the call of
the chairman as necessary. Structured agenda were to be distributed in advance
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to permit preparation for participation. The chairman was to arrange for cog-
nizant NASA officials to take whatever implementing or other actions were required
as a result of Council deliberations. The chairman was to be authorized to
establish ad hoc panels or committees as necessary to conduct the work of the
Council. The activities of the routine half-day and special meetings were
generally to consider implications, provide guidance, and set policy relative to
matters appropriate to bring to the Administrator's level. The all-day monthly
meetings, or General Management Reviews, were to be conducted as information
exchanges rather than as decision forums and were intended to provide management
with an agency-wide awareness of pending problems, needs for policy statements,
and implications relating to NASA's interaction with other agencies. Decision
meetings, implied as a result of these monthly meetings, were to be conducted
in the established line elements of the organization.
The Planning System was to involve steering, coordinating, and working
groups, led by senior line managers and scientists with representation from
Headquarters program and functional offices and from the field centers, to
develop planning options on a disciplined basis. These options were then to
be formulated into overall agency program alternatives for consideration by
top management.
The Planning System was perceived as the agency-wide procedure for:
(a) developing plans, programs and budgets for consideration by NASA management
for internal planning purposes; and (b) developing data and information required
for NASA's annual submissions to the Bureau of the Budget (now Office of
Management and Budget) including program memoranda and budget material. The
objectives of the System were to:
1. identify major programmaing and budgeting issues for management
consideration and decision.
2. provide a basis for budget submissions to BOB.
3. develop significant alternative program possibilities so that
management decisions and recommendations can be knowledgeably and effectively
determined.
4. involve a wide representation of headquarters, centers, line, and
staff elements in the annual budgetary process.
5. relate the Planning System in a fundamental way to subsequent
program development and project approval processes.
A Planning Steering Group was to be established to receive and
elaborate guidance from the Administrator and his senior associates, including
the Management Council, to guide and review the activities of the Planning
Coordinating Group, described below, and to make appropriate submissions to
the Management Council and the Administrator.
A Planning Coordinating Group was to be established to receive
guidance from the Planning Steering Group, to coordinate the preparation of
annual planning through Working Groups described below, and to submit the
results of such planning to the Planning Steering Group for review and
direction and eventual submission to the Management Council and the Administrator.
Working Groups were to be established for the preparation of
planning in each of a number of program categories describing major coherent
portions of the NASA program and in such additional categories as may be
considered desirable. The tasks of the Working Groups were to define goals
and objectives in each program category, to identify major programming and
budgeting issues, to develop meaningful alternative program and project
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approaches to meet the objectives of each program category, to provide bases
for evaluation of such alternatives, to provide for or identify special
analyses required, to point out the immediate and long-range implications of
such alternatives, and to provide such additional or modified material as
may be desired by management and/or the BOB.
Each Working Group was to develop Planning Source Documentation
which collected and organized the basic data prepared in carrying out the
above tasks and which was to be used as a source for the Program Memorandum
to be prepared by the chairman of the Working Group. Additionally, the
Planning Source Documentation was to be a source of material required for
future Project Approval Documents and material of relevance to long-range
planning.
Reactions of Participants. Although the reactions of the participants
to the "principles," underlying problems, and proposed organizational remedies
varied considerably, there were certain areas of agreement. First, the
reactions were revealing in disclosing how little consensus there was on
"principles" or on the theory or doctrine to which they related. While there
was no discounting of the basic importance of organization and administration
as central factors in determining performance, there was no concurrence that
NASA's success could be correlated with particular organization and
management systems per se. Nor was there agreement that NASA's emerging
problems stemmed primarily from organization and management considerations.
The participants emphasized that, after a serious effort to identify
some new and innovative concepts which would fall together into a total
conceptual framework, the analysis produced only an elaboration of some
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well-known precepts. For each "principle" adduced to explain a management
approach or technique used successfully, there appeared to be a contrary
"principal" which was applicable in other times or situations.
One participant commented that the principles struck him as a
guide to good behavior by top management prepared by middle management. Many
of the principles constitute things top management should not have done or
should have done in a different way. The principles represent the kind of
document that the Barons of Runneymede would have signed in order to get
proper behavior from King John. But they are not what Machiavelli would have
advised his Prince in connection with running his domain, either from the
viewpoint of administration or the totality of the job. In his opinion,
the principles seem incomplete and underestimate the long-term values of a
good deal of healthy disagreement and leadership behavior that end up being
very productive in the long run, even though they are difficult for the staff
to live with in the meantime.
Another participant noted that, when a program is expanding with
considerable resources and many projects, the management situation is
quite different than when the program is being consolidated with an emphasis
on internal control. In other words, the principles change to reflect program
development, thrust, and emphasis.
It was pointed out that the 'principles" had not determined the
existing organizational structure or the operating procedures of NASA. A
participant observed that it must be kept in mind that there was a real
distinction between the way NASA actually operated and the "principles."
There was general agreement among the participants that the external
environment within which NASA operated had changed greatly and this change,
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in part at least, was reflected in Newell's analysis. One participant
observed that, during the period in which Newell made his analysis, there
was a full change in the external environment. It changed drastically from
the standpoint of White House and Congressional support which declined as
the program evolved and as other national issues and problems arose. A
large part of the increased control, implicit in the Newell approach, was a
reaction to the fact that it was necessary to exercise increased control because
top management had new and major problems due to changes in the external
environment.
It was pointed out that there had been three criteria
for investment in the space program: (1) national survival based upon fear
of the achievements of the Russian space program; (2) economic growth and
the provision of jobs; and (3) cultural development including man's desire
to know himself and his, environment. The first two criteria do not drive the
space program today and, with the Viet Nam war and the myriad of domestic
needs, the cultural criterion is not persuasive when the space program has
been built to almost a $6.0 billion level with a $2.5 billion overhead. Then
the world around NASA changed in terms of criteria for investment. This caused
NASA leadership to become introspective and to focus on the relatively
unimportant -- for the time -- problems of management and difficulties that
arose within the management group. But if NASA leadership is to be useful
in helping to determine how the enterprise is to be used in the future, it
must begin to look in the marketplace and determine what the market is for
various NASA capabilities.
Another participant expressed the feeling that Newell developed the
principles as devices that are necessary to enable NASA to deal better with
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new problems which arose mainly from the external environment. Tle changes
required related more to the political situation than to the technical aspects
of making intelligent decisions as to how agency planning should be carried
out and when the planning should be exposed to public scrutiny.
Third, the participants felt that Newell had identified a number
of management and organizational problems and deficiencies that had existed for
some time. One participant commented, "The last piece of paper we sent through
involved relatively minor policy. It concerned the NASA position relative to
reimbursement for supersonic testing. The clearance process should have taken
a few days. It took months.
As one member observed, "How we learn to deal with the effects
of increased program magnitude in an element of a cluster -- whether that element
ought to be split off and what such action would mean to the Headquarters
organization from an effective management point-of-view and with regard to the
reporting chain from the field centers to the Headquarters -- is a major
problem now confronting NASA."
Another participant remarked that the situation of the field centers
was very difficult. Their programs have fallen off but they do not have
flexibility in paring down the work force. The centers do not know how to
cope with Civil Service procedures in such a way that, in reducing the size of
the staff, the best people can be retained and the less competent terminated.
The presumption is that the system works exactly the opposite.
Finally, there was a feeling that Newell's proposed organizational
remedies had merit. One participant stated that Newell's work had already
had a noticeable influence in increasing participation in the overall decision-
making process. Most Headquarters staff and program offices are now aware
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of, and interested in, the problems of the other offices. This was not the
case before Newell's analysis. Moreover, the field centers -- which formerly
were rather parochial in their viewpoints -- are now becoming interested in
what happens to the various NASA programs. This is a kind of maturing that
does not always occur. Since there is now greater participation, primarily
through the new planning system, and greater involvement of the peer group
through the Management Council, there is a growing awareness in each Headquarters
office and in the field centers of the problems of the other NASA components.
Reaction to the Planning System however, was mixed. Some participants
believed it represented a major improvement in the formal planning process in
NASA. Others felt that the System was overly elaborate with too many levels
and groups; the field center directors were not adequately involved; the
synthesis stage of the planning process was to be conducted by Headquarters
rather than operating personnel; and the essential staff support for planning
was lacking.
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Chapter 3
Factors Contributing to Effective Management
In addition to the considerations cited above in connection with the
several reorganizations, additional diverse factors contributed to the effec-
tive management of NASA during the decade of the sixties. They included a num-
ber of apparently opposite or contradictory concepts -- centralization and decen-
tralization; internally generated forces and the influence of the external eviron-
ment; administrative policies based on the conscious decision-making of senior
management and a certain amount of fortuitous convergence of the right person with
the right ideas at the right time; systems of management applied across the board
and individuals with highly individual styles of management; an "in-house" com-
petence within NASA Headquarters and field centers as well as a widespread compe-
tence fostered by NASA through contracting with the industrial sector; a certain
pragmatism and a willingness to adapt proved techniques from any quarter as well
as an adherence to some guiding concepts of management; and the challenge of a
wide diversity of complex and difficult technical undertakings and the driving
force provided by the stimulating challenge of landing men on the moon.
Discussion throughout the seminar series underscored the hypothesis that
the high record of achievement scored by NASA in fulfilling its various missions
could not be ascribed to any single factor. The participants differed as to their
perceptions of the major features of NASA management. In fact, there was some
agreement on the proposition advanced by one participant that "you cannot talk
about the NASA system of management." The seminar illuminated significant distin-
guishing characteristics in NASA methods of management. But monolithic concepts
of management were not considered the key to success. It was viewed, rather, as
the result of an interaction of many factors and forces, often exerting counter-
vailing pressures.
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Leadership and the Troika. One of the major features of NASA senior
management was the existence of a three man collegial executive. For most of the
first five critical years of his administration of NASA, Webb was able to rely on
his two principal associates who, with him, formed what came to be called the
troika. This three-man directorship rested upon a mutual agreement on division
of responsibilities according to areas of competence and a decision-making and
administrative process operating through consensus. Dryden's scientific and tech-
nical background equipped him to provide the technician's expertise. He had
joined NASA's predecessor organization, the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics (NACA) in 1947, and bacame the head of that agency. Dryden served as
Acting Administrator of NASA during the interval between Glennan's departure and
Webb's assumption of duties in January 1961. Webb had known Dryden and had de-
veloped a high regard for his capabilities and judgment through earlier NACA as-
sociations. He therefore welcomed Dryden's designation by President Kennedy as
Deputy Administrator.
The third member of the team, Robert C. Seamans, Jr., had also been
a senior official of NASA before Webb's appointment, and the two had known
each other when they had served together as executives of the Sperry Company.
Seamans had acquired extensive engineering and R & D management experience
through a career which included teaching at MIT, management of an industrial
research laboratory and, finally, experience in NASA as Associate Administrator
with jurisdiction over all of NASA's internal operations. Seamans, in effect,
filled the role of General Manager of NASA during the Webb administration.
Recognizing the areas of special competence of his two principal
associates, Webb focused his efforts particularly upon his own area
of strength -- NASA's external relations and the cultivation of political
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support. He served as the principal external link with the executive and legis-
lative branches. Internally, he focused on the development of sound administrative
and management practices. As the Administrator, he was the final authority,
and the responsibility of his position could not ultimately be delegated. But
he made it a point in practice to operate jointly with his two associates
in what turned out to be a unique pattern of management of large-scale enterprise.
Webb's background and political contacts served NASA well. Webb and
his colleagues made no effort to disguise the fact that support for the space
program was closely linked to public support of it. By law, NASA was required
to operate an "open" program. It enjoyed none of the opportunities of the
Soviet space program to keep failures secret.
The caliber of leadership provided by the three senior administrators
of NASA and the other top echelons of management, both at Headquarters and in
the field, contributed to development of a climate of confidence both within
the agency and in its external relationships with the public and with other
parts of the federal government, notably the Congress. Under this leadership,
the space program came to symbolize the effort to reinvigorate national life
through science and technology. Top leadership of the agency saw NASA's mission
as one which was closely linked to domestic goals, and this view was widely
accepted at the time. This general acceptance of the importance of its mission
and the high degree of confidence in the quality of its leadership helped to form
a favorable environment for the space program.
At the outset of Webb's administration he and his two senior associates
agreed upon a decision-making procedure to which they would adhere. The main
elements of this system included the following: careful advance consideration
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of the theoretical and doctrinal concepts upon which agency action would be
based, mutual three-way agreement upon all important action programs and policy
decisions, and, in the implementation and coordination stage, an understanding
that each of the three could act more or less independently and, where
necessary, in substitution for each other.
The system was exceptional in several respects. It juxtaposed three
individuals of exceptional abilities whose strengths complemented one another.
They shared together a large body of common or overlapping experience which
fostered good communication, mutual understanding, and respect. The
possibilities of duplicating such a combination of individuals in another time
and place are remote. The system operated on the basis of consensus. In all their
major decisions, the three men never failed to achieve unanimity.
The system worked efficiently in many different types of decision-
making. It operated well in deliberations on the overall organization and
management of the agency and on such specific and discrete issues as selection
of major contractors for NASA programs.
The three men believed that one of their principal responsibilities
was to oversee the source selection process. They formed themselves into a
three-man committee which made the final determination of source selection for
every contract over $5 million.
Webb described the source evaluation process as follows:
...Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, and I determined that we would personally
examine, in detail, the results of the work of all source evaluation
boards on competitively negotiated contracts that amounted to 5
million dollars or more. We expected these boards to appear before
us personally in a formal setting and make a full and complete
presentation of (1) the method chosen to break down for evaluation the
contractor proposals, (2) the results achieved in the application
of this method, and (3) the judgment of the board on each of the
categories of the breakdown. The effect of this systematic approach
to a continuous emphasis on the judgment factor has been that for
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five years, on innumerable occasions and for extended periods,
the three senior officials of NASA have sat side by side and
personally examined in detail, and tested by question and
answer, the quality of the individual and collective contributions
of these boards to major decisions affecting the area where ninety
percent of our resources are expended. We thus formed our own
personal judgments, based on a great deal of personal involvement,
as to the validity of board findings. We deeply immersed ourselves
on a daily basis in very complete analyses of the main factors,
within NASA and at the plants of our contractors, on which our
projects depend for success, and the views, approaches, and
analytical judgment of our senior personnel. In this process we
were able to observe and evaluate how rapidly the organization and its
contractors were developing their capabilities, and how effective
our effort to get nine-tenths of NASA's work done by contractors
was proving. We believe this constant and visible personal contact
among NASA's three senior officials and the other responsible
personnel involved in the hard problems and decisions in procurement
provided a great deal of stimulation, motivation, and innovation
throughout the organization.
The fact that the three senior officers of the agency would take
the time to conduct what amounted to a thorough hearing and question-
and-answer period on each contractor selection action enabled all
levels of management, in Headquarters and in our Centers, to get
their questions out on the table before all three of us for debate
and clarification. Another important result was that, when the pre-
sentation to the three of us was over, everyone involved had a clear
understanding of the elements basic to a proper decision and every-
one in NASA concerned with the matter was aware of this. The burden
then passed to Dryden, Seamans, and me to make the final decision,
and the personnel of the boards were in position to form their own
judgments as to whether the three of us did in fact arrive at the
best decision as indicated by the facts and analysis. Further an
important element of a NASA-wide and pervasive self-policing system
was thereby established. This has had an important effect on main-
taining high standards throughout the agency.9
'Clarity of Goals. NASA is committed to achieving goals more readily
definable in the discrete terms of the physical sciences than the goals of
more social oriented agencies. Admittedly,rthe long-range goals of NASA are
constantly evolving and there is a continuing process of review and refine-
ment of the objectives of individual NASA programs and projects. But there
is less room for ambiguity in the goals of space and aeronautics endeavors
9. NASA, Preliminary History of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Chapter VI, pp. 27, January 15, 1969.
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than in most of the broad social and economic programs of other federal agencies
and departments. Certainly, the basic objective of landing men on the moon pro-
vided a clear and tangible goal which inspired even those who were not directly
involved in Apollo.
During his third year in office, in 1963, Webb began to develop the
position that the space program, in a broad sense, encompassed goals beyond the
development of a national space capability as specified in the space act. These
goals included the provision of support to broad national objectives in the realms
of both national security and domestic affairs. The space program was a means of
providing thrust in critical areas of domestic, social, and economic affairs.
Webb's deep personal interest in the university affairs program was an extension
of this philosophy. Likewise, Webb was committed to the idea that NASA's goals
included assistance to other government agencies in meeting their objectives and
transferring to them some of the techniques and learning experiences developed
in NASA. The emphasis on industry contracting was a means of channeling the stim-
ulus from the space program into an important new sector of American industry.
This was the concept of NASA which generated broad public support and,
in the Congress, support from both sides of the aisle. But, between the time when
this concept prevailed and the time of Webb's departure from the agency, there was
a falling off of such support. The spin-off from the space program which had been
anticipated did not live up to the initial optimistic expectations. Despite the
significant impact of space technology development in non-space fields, the per-
ception of that impact in the eyes of the public and the Congress was less than
had been anticipated. The internal NASA decision-making process was altered
drastically by changes in the power structure in Congress. In the early and middle
sixties, the Administrator was able to deal with three or four Congressmen and de-
termine whether a program, or several programs, would be approved by Congress.
Later, it became extremely difficult to determine which Congressional offices
could assess the mood of Congress on particular issues in the areas of NASA
interest.
Other major issues on the troubled domestic scene in the latter half
of the sixties began to compete with the space program. The anti-technology move-
ment gathered new momentum. Webb was keenly sensitive to these changes and aware
of the risk involved in trying to obtain commitment to a long-range plan for the
agency. He felt obliged to maintain a range of options rather than closing off
potential avenues of opportunity.
The emphasis in early seminar discussions on the importance of clarity
of goals as a driving force for the overall agency effort was complemented in
later discussions which dealt with the severe problems posed for an agency when
its mission became less clear and when the sense of urgency or national commitment
was reduced. If the early successes of NASA depended so heavily upon a drive to
reach certain discrete and well defined goals, the failure later on to articulate
comparable new goals might well be expected to weaken the driving force and the
overall performance of the agency.
Mission Orientation. One of the recurring themes in the seminar series
was the importance of mission orientation as a driving force. The second seminar,
a discussion of the Office of Price Administration operations during World War II,
pointed up a number of parallels and similarities in operation between that mission-
oriented effort and the space program. In commenting on the OPA, on participant
noted:
This, from the outset, was an extremely enthusiastic and
dedicated, convinced group. They were convinced that, if
they did not control and did not ration these goods, there
would be economic disasters which would interfere with the
war effort. They thought they were doing the most important
thing they could do. For many of them, this was the most ex-
citing thing they had ever done.
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The parallel between the OPA and NASA which emerged clearly from this
discussion was the importance of commitment to an overriding mission. Even
though there were a number of apparent differences in the character of the two
agencies, each was strongly mission oriented. The nature of the problems to
be resolved in each case dictated the process for dealing with them and the pro-
cess itself provided the major thrust for the program. The very mission of each
agency inspired dedication among its personnel. One of the key differences noted
by a NASA representative was the fact that OPA expertise was centered in Washington
while NASA expertise was located, as noted above, primarily in the field. In each
case, however, a central core of specialists, highly motivated by their personal
sense of mission, kept the agency moving towards the fulfillment of its objectives.
A number of participants agreed in the final session that what drove
the system more than any other factor was the engineering process or the basic
technological nature of NASA's mission. That mission required bringing together
in the proper interrelationship all the physical components necessary for the end
product. The high technology nature of the NASA mission was the force which tied
all the various elements of the total space program together in a working system.
One participant summarized this factor as follows:
This is the most cohesive organization because you have
no other choice. The system requires it. Even people from
very diverse backgrounds have been able to pull this off.
This has been the tremendous strength of this organization.
It has failed in some places. The (Apollo) disaster can be
traced back to lack of cohesion, and other problems.
Centralized Management of a Decentralized Operation. One of the major
sources of NASA management vitality and strength derives from the field centers.
Some of these centers had been inherited from the National Advisory Committee on
Aeronautics, some had been transferred from the military establishment, and the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology had been
attached to NASA by means of a unique contractual arrangement. Each of the ten
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centers had its own very distinctive institutional personality and way of doing
things. Each valued its professional autonomy. And each shared the traditional
skepticism of the field towards Headquarters.
As NASA geared up for its mission, and particularly for meeting the
tight deadlines of the manned lunar landing, the agency's options ranged between:
(1) attempting to bring the field centers into a centralized and unified system
of management; and (2) allowing the centers to continue in a decentralized rela-
tionship with a high order of independent managerial judgment to be exercised in
the field. The course followed by NASA was roughly midway between -- centralized
management of a decentralized field network. The centers were more or less their
own masters in their special areas of competence, while Headquarters managed the
total system and the overall interrelationships.
One of the seminar participants, who had played a role in the process
of organizing the field center system, characterized the centers as follows:
These are strange beasts. They are multipurpose centers and are
managed as what we now call 'mixed organizations.' They run all
the way from a little bit of basic research to some rather large
development projects. The fact that they are mixed organizations
means that you have to handle the various groups doing various
things in varying ways. Each of the pieces has to be managed dif-
ferently. These are the types of organizations we are going to
have lots of in the future. It takes a very clever guy to run
one of these things. The important thing about NASA Headquarters
is they never prescribe how to run a center. They aren't that
naive.
Headquarters found that the centers had to be given wide latitude in
determining how they operate. They required freedom to experiment. Center manage-
ment was free to try out new ideas and approaches. If they worked, they received
Headquarters support.
There are several lines of authority linking Headquarters and the field
centers. Each field center director reports to a specified program Associate
Administrator. For major programs or projects there are additional links. A
If
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Headquarters Program Manager exercises a line responsibility with respect to a
given undertaking. Another link between Headquarters and field centers consists
of systems managers who have responsibility as a direct staff function, to assure
that performance, cost, and schedule requirements for each mission are met. Fi-
nally, NASA augments its Headquarters/field "line" with the staff specialities
in major functional areas of administrative management, legal counsel, safety, and
public affairs. NASA's purpose has been to withhold from the line operator certain
specified authorities to act until he has obtained clearance from the appropriate
program or functional management element. Considerable care has been taken to
determine the situations under which the line operator, the program manager, or
the functional staff expert has responsibility to make decisions which are binding
upon the others. Under such a three-way structure, managerial success depends upon
extensive communication among people who share parts of the action rather than en-
trepreneurial defense of explicitly defined zones of delegated authority. This
is not a place for the man who insists he can be responsive to only one boss.
The key to making the NASA structure work rests upon creating an ef-
fective network of formal and informal communications. Actual decisions are made
by responsible officials in a fairly conventional way. To be on the safe side,
NASA may err in over-communicating upward, laterally, and downward. The communi-
cations system engulfs anyone who can conceivably influence or implement the de-
cesion. In an unending effort to exchange information in real time, it uses
telephone hot lines, executive aircraft, datafax, long distance conference hookups
by voice and data display, and computer data transmissions.1 0
10. For a discussion of NASA internal communications see Albert F.
Siepert, "NASA'S Management of the Civilian Space Program," a speech prepared
for TIMS (The Institute for Management Science) in Necw York City, March 28, 1969.
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An important aspect of Webb's management philosophy, which shaped the
framework for decision-making throughout his administration of the space agency,
was his strong preference for a system that would permit many alternatives to
be considered all the way up to the top levels of the agency. He sought to avoid
becoming "the prisoner of preferred solutions." He recognized a serious danger
in decision-making machinery involving so many people at the higher levels that
decisions are delayed or watered down. At the same time, Webb sought to avoid
a process at the working levels in which too few viewpoints were represented and
the range of alternatives was narrowed down prematurely.
Despite all the communications linkages and multiple Headquarters/field
center interfaces, there was some feeling, as voiced by Webb in the first seminar,
that the total system had not been very successful in bringing the practical
judgments of field center directors to the attention of the senior administrators.
The upward flow of field center inputs to top Headquarters levels was sometimes
impeded. The General Manager system, which funneled administrative matters into
the Associate Administrator's Office, sometimes proved an obstruction. But the
nature of NASA's task in the pre-Apollo period may not have required as much inter-
change as was needed when the post-Apollo transition began. Then the building of
good communications between Headquarters and field centers became one of the
major problems of agency administration.
During the mid and late sixties, the concept of centralized management
of the decentralized operation of the field centers worked quite effectively
towards achieving the technical goals of the space program. For the most part,
the individual field centers tended to pursue their own interests in a somewhat
parochial manner, collaborating with other centers as necessary towards fulfill-
ment of specific program goals and objectives.
Adaptability and Experimentation. A principal hallmark of NASA manage-
ment was the premium placed on adaptability, flexibility, and experimentation.
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It provided for dynamic interaction between theNASA structure and the environ-
ment within which it operated. It provided for rapid feedback of information
and decision-making to take account of changing circumstances.
The leadership of NASA was not interested in stability or equilibrium
for their own sake. It recognized the positive value of conflict and imbalance,
provided they contributed to getting the job accomplished. It was apparent from
the beginning of the Apollo program, for example, that it would become by far
the dominant program in NASA and that the success of the entire agency would be
judged in terms of its performance. The Office of Manned Space Flight obviously
would become the largest and most powerful of the four program offices in NASA.
The following table shows the relationship between allocations for
manned space and the total NASA budget for the decade 1961-1970. During that
period, the ratio rose from 43 percent in fiscal 1961 to a peak of 69 percent in
fiscal 1968.
Relation of Total NASA Budget
to the Manned Space Program
(in millions)
Total NASA
$ 964,000
1,825,300
3,674,000
5,100,000
5,250,000
5,175,000
4,968,000
4,589,000
3,995,000
3,696,000
Manned Space
$ 416,000
914,000
2,253,000
3,421,000
3,425,000
3,509,000
3,385,000
3,146,000
2,499,000
2,374,000
Percentage of Manned
Space to Total NASA
43
50
61
67
65
68
68
69
63
64
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
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Although a great deal of NASA unmanned space and aeronautics activity
had little or no connection with the manned space program, the latter provided
a stimulus and a driving force felt throughout the Headquarters and the field
centers. NASA administrators came to perceive certain positive benefits deriv-
ing from the imbalance between the manned space and other NASA endeavors.
Built into NASA management in the 1960's was a full recognition that
the primacy of the Apollo program was a fact of life with many implications for
the overall space program. The Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), which
controlled such a sizable share of the total NASA financial and personnel
resources, quite naturally came to see its role as being more than that of
an equal among all NASA programs. In fact, the very question of the imbalance
between OMSF and the other program offices was a subject of deliberation in
some of the early meetings of the NASA Management Council. These discussions
brought out a recognition on the part of the Associate Administrators of the
other program offices that the manned space flight mission represented an
extremely valuable thrust for the total space program, and that the overall
program would suffer from the absence of a program offering a comparable for-
ward thrust for the agency.
The discussion of imbalance and the competition for resources within
NASA led into the corollary discussion of how, given these somewhat divisive
forces, NASA managed to operate as a cohesive unit in the execution of programs.
If there was imbalance between OMSF and the other program offices, if there was
institutional friction between Headquarters and the field centers, and among
the various field centers, how was it possible that NASA programs achieved their
objectives successfully? How had the Apollo program maintained its timetable?
Discussions in the seminar frequently returned to the concepts of
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adaptability and experimentation. Senior administrators, it was noted, were
open to suggestions for change and willing to adopt the best management
techniques from whatever source, even at the cost of disturbing and unsettling
existing organizational patterns and relationships between individuals.
Whatever management innovation was achieved came on the basis of an eclectic
and pragmatic approach. The senior administrators saw their task as one of
effectively organizing the use of what was at hand in the total inventory of
national resources and capabilities. They recognized that, for the NASA mission,
as for most large scale enterprises, the basic knowledge and technology and
the human and material resources were available. To achieve an effective large
scale management systems, senior administrators concentrated continuing attention
on the restructuring and organizing of existing resources and technological
competence.
In-House Competence. Under statutory requirement, NASA activities
are to be so conducted as to make "the most effective utilization of the
scientific and engineering resources of the United States" with participation
by the scientific community in planning scientific measurements and observations
and with "the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information
concerning its activities and the results thereof." From the start, NASA has
developed and used a combined government-industry-university basis upon which to
build its aeronautics and space programs. The concept was established during
the first five years of NASA's existence and it is fundamental to NASA's
operations. The integration of all these resources in a single system has
been described as "participative responsibility."
As NASA began to move forward into the implementation of the new
programs that had been proposed by President Kennedy in 1961, the magnitude
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and complexity of the civilian space program became apparent. The collabora-
tive team of government, industry, and universities which NASA had set out to
assemble was seen as a necessary way to carry out the space program. The
agency's program, therefore, was to be conducted not by NASA alone. Its
accomplishment was to depend on a complex of resources, successfully drawing
together organizations and capabilities of all segments of the national economy,
and integrating them into an effective operational system.
In Webb's words,
We have sought on the one hand, to minimize the disruptive
effects of what has necessarily been a vast undertaking, and,
on the other hand, to so conduct our operations as to strengthen
in every way feasible the positive values of our society and
its institutions. We rejected a proposal by one large
industrial firm to do the entire lunar landing job single handed,
as well as a similar proposal by a leading. university to operate
a laboratory that could do all the scientific research.
We decided as a matter of deliberate policy to place
principal reliance on the American industrial establishment and
the American university system as a whole. We decided to focus
our governmental efforts principally on developing the needed
in-house competence to make responsible decisions, and on
organizing and managing.I I
For example, NASA could bring in experts from-its field centers,
from universities, or from other government laboratories easily and without
the contractor having to "lose face" institutionally in tackling an intractable
problem. The concept was to manage the project on a teamwork basis in order
to avoid unnecessary delays that otherwise might be occasioned by working
11. James E. Webb, Space Age Management: The Large-Scale Approach,
McGraw-Hill, pp. 113, 1969.
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across organizational boundaries separating public, private, and semi-private
organizations. The same practice applied' to NASA's field centers and project
groups -- organizational boundaries were not to interfere with the application
of needed talent. Respect was to be maintained for the semiautonomous
status of the NASA field centers which were the locus of most of NASA's
technical talent in depth. This required a different organizational construct
from that of previous project management. NASA leaders were unwilling to accept
the prevailing style of project management most typically found in the
Department of Defense (DOD) throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. The DOD
approach was characterized as writing tight specifications for the development
program, letting the contract, and going away until the project emerged. The
weakness in this system was that it did not provide for satisfactory, positive
intervention by the customer (the government agency) in the solution of, and
decision on, the technical problems which inevitably arise in a development
program.
In contrast, the NASA concept is that no single company, regardless
of its excellence, has all of the skills and experience required for the
execution of a large space flight project. Therefore, although relying
predominantly upon the aerospace industry to build, integrate, and test flight
hardware, NASA used its, in-house management and technical competence, which
it had in considerable breadth and depth, to monitor and work with the contractor.
NASA retained the authority and the means for tapping a much wider variety of
technical competence to overcome problems confronting a contractor on a project.
'Program and Project Management. In NASA terminology, a "program"
means a related series of undertakings which continue over a period of time
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(normally years), and which are designed to accomplish a broad scientific
or technical goal in NASA's long-range plan, such as Lunar Planetary
Exploration. Program responsibility is assigned to the appropriate program
office within NASA Headquarters. A "project" is an undertaking with a
scheduled beginning and ending, within a program, normally involving the
construction and operation of one or more aeronautical or space vehicles and
necessary ground support in order to accomplish a scientific or technical
objective; or the design, development and demonstration of major advanced
hardware items; or the design, construction and operation of a new launch
vehicle.
NASA has identified the program manager's vis-a-vis the project
manager's role as follows. A program manager is the senior NASA staff official
exclusively responsible for developing and administering the Headquarters
guidelines and controls. He is the focal point of all NASA Headquarters
activity bearing directly upon those projects which comprise his program. He
is responsible for developing and administering the Headquarters guidelines and
controls under which those projects are conducted. On large space flight projects,
the program manager frequently has cognizance over only one project.
A project manager is the senior NASA official at the field center
exclusively responsible for the execution of a project within guidelines and
controls prescribed by NASA Headquarters and his field center management. The
project manager is the focal point of all field center activity bearing directly
on his project. He carries out these responsibilities within his delegated
authority in the'name of the field center director. Much of the actual work
may be performed outside the'project organization in divisional offices, in
other parts of the agency, or in the contractor firms by people outside the
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project manager's direct administrative authority. On project matters,
however, these individuals take direction from the project manager.
NASA's organizational structure is designed to provide the
essential support to the project manager while balancing support against
the broader program goals of NASA. In effect, there is a dual system of
project control. The role of the project manager can be characterized as
"Mr. Inside," responsible for the day-to-day supervision and the execution
of the project as carried out by industrial contractors, NASA and other
government laboratories, and university experimenters. The program manager
fulfills the role of "Mr. Outside," fighting the battles of resource allocation
within NASA Headquarters, preparing testimony and justification for Presidential
and congressional authorization, working with other government and nongovernment
organizations interested in or participating in the project, and monitoring
the project execution to control significant variations from the Headquarters
approved Project Plan. Each has a critical and specific (sometimes conflicting)
role to perform; but, in the positive sense, they are seen as mutually supporting
(when performed correctly), constituting a critical axis of relationships.
Executive Personnel Management. In comparison with most other
federal agencies, NASA enjoys unusual discretionary authority with regard to
its executive personnel. The Space Act of 1958, as amended, gave the NASA
Administrator the authority, within limits, to appoint and fix the compensation
of scientific, engineering, and administrative personnel, now numbering about
500, without regard to Civil Service appointment and compensation laws. Initially
a $19,000 per year ceiling was placed on the bulk of the positions and a
$21,000 ceiling on the balance. At that time, the highest grade -- GS-18 --
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under the Classification Act had a single rate of $17,500 and the $21,000
level was the same as that for heads of major independent agencies and most
departmental Under Secretaries.
From the early days of NASA, especial attention was given to the
use of this authority. Administrator Glennan, on October 28, 1958, issued
a policy statement providing that: (1) authority to make excepted appointments
would be used to attract and retain personnel vital to the agency; (2) salaries
would be made as competitive as possible with industry; and (3) identical
eligibility criteria would be used for current and for new executive personnel.
In addition, the Deputy Administrator and the operating office directors
were to make recommendations to the Administrator on the establishment of
excepted positions and appointments to fill them, recommendations on appointments
were to be based upon thorough appraisal of the individual, and all positions
were to be reviewed annually.
This special authority enabled the NASA Administrator not only to
recruit, appoint, and fix the compensation of a relatively large number of kev
executives but also to dismiss, demote, or transfer such persons. The impor-
tance of this latter flexibility to the success of NASA is underlined by the
following statement by Administrator Webb:
One of the most important things we have done in NASA has
been to encourage good executive performance and executive de-
velopment through constant "upward pressure." We have followed,
wherever possible, the practice of deliberately assigning
to our executives jobs outside of their normal range of experience
and beyond their demonstrated competence. I am not talking
about a "job-rotation" training system. Our object is to challenge,
under firing-line conditions, the ability of the executive to
perform at a higher level. Such purposeful shifting of personnel
to new and more difficult jobs--and an often-accompanying process
of trying out a new organizational concept--might be characterized
as a form of "designed disequilibrium." Through it, both weak-
nesses and strengths in the executive group are surfaced, as are
also many organizational deficiencies and needs.
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The practice is a tough one. It can be hard on the individual
who finds himself out of a familiar groove in which he has been
doing quite well and in a new and trying situation where he has
to struggle to keep his head above water. It can also be costly to
the agency when executives who have been adequate at a lower
level are found to be inadequate in the higher job. However, these
are not too-high prices to pay for continued development of
strengths, for removal of weaknesses, and for identifying executives
of the highest quality.
The value of such an approach is sufficient, in my mind, to.
justify consideration of a system of periodic "selection-out" actions
in the lowest 10 percent of our approximately two hundred project
managers. Such a selection-out decision could well be made even
if a manager were judged adequate on his present job. The aim
would be to keep a systematic pressure on the entire system,
forcing identification of managers capable of handling complex
programs such as the Apollo project, the Manned Space Flight
program, or the job of the Administrator.
Another aspect of the matter is that in a large complex
endeavor the situation is too fluid to permit the fixation of
either jobs or people in jobs. The nature of tasks and demands
changes too rapidly for a static setup to be effective.1 2
In reflecting upon the manner in which this special authority had
been used and the results upon NASA, one participant commented:
People have been tested. Some have been stressed near their
yield points. Personally, I believe this has been to the
great benefit of nearly all the individuals concerned as well
as to the betterment of the organization. The disasters have been
very few. In general, people have been stimulated and have
grown. Qualities have been discovered in executives that
otherwise likely would not have been. It has been an experiment,
not without some costs but, on the whole, very beneficial.
There is little doubt that the flexibility given NASA by this
special authority has been a major factor in attracting and utilizing high
caliber executive personnel and has contributed significantly to the success
of the NASA program.
12. James E. Webb, Space Age Management: The Large-Scale Approach,
McGraw-Hill, pp. 159-160, 1969.
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Chapter 4
Central Problems
A survey of the factors contributing to NASA's success reveals how
many were peculiar to the time and circumstances. Strong external political
and public support, an exceptional three-man leadership team in the Webb,
Dryden, Seamans combination, and the central thrust provided by the Apollo
mission were all unique attributes of the time. As these conditions and
circumstances changed in the late sixties, new kinds of problems began to
require the attention of NASA senior administrators. Discussion in the
latter phase of the seminar series focused increasingly on the problems of
transition and particularly such issues as the planning process, matching
capability with workload, maintaining organizational vitality, and the system
of checks and balances.
Planning. Planning the long term future of the space program in
terms of specific goals and objectives and the correlated task of determin-
ing which programs would be marketable have proved to be among the most dif-
ficult tasks of NASA leadership. Despite the continued existence of a plan-
ning office reporting to the Associate Administrator and despite task forces
and committees formed expressly for the purpose of comprehensive planning,
the agency encountered great difficulty in setting future objectives which
could gain adequate levels of support from Congress and the public. The
problems encountered by NASA in defining its future goals were discussed at
length in the seminar. These discussions revealed that external or political
factors played a determining role in shaping the planning function of the
agency. Administrative considerations, such as where the planning office was
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located and how-it was structured and staffed, tended to be of secondary
importance in comparison with external factors such as changing Congressional
attitudes and-diminishing-public concern about Soviet-competition in space.
The NASA Preliminary History cites three major periods of decision
on U.S. space policy and NASA funding under Johnson's five year Presidency.1 1
Early in 1964 Johnson asked Congress for strong backing for a program designed
to give the United States pre-eminence in space. Congress responded positively and,
during 1964, 1965, and 1966, the NASA budget was at its maximum level,
ranging from $5.1 to $5.25 billion a year.
In 1967 President Johnson sought Congressional approval for
continuing the production and use of the Saturn-Apollo space system and for
several new programs for the next decade. On this occasion, for the first
time, he received a limited and uncertain response.
In 1968, as the Preliminary History notes, "the failure to start
new long lead-time projects and limitations on NASA funding placed NASA in the
position of emphasizing the completion of current programs for the Sixties and
striving to find some way not to face an almost complete cessation of flight
missions in the Seventies." As of that time, all on-going NASA projects were
based on plans adopted in 1961-62. In effect, the overall program of NASA,
under way in 1969, had not been supplemented or altered in any substantial
way from the concepts developed almost a decade previously. This caused
considerable concern among working levels of NASA personnel who felt a need
for a plan extending beyond a lunar landing.
One of the seminar participants pointed out that there had been a
vacuum in long-range planning in the first half of the sixties because NASA
leadership did not want a long-range plan developed. Although it was not
the official external position of the agency, NASA leadership gave explicit
instructions within the agency not to develop a single long-range plan.
This instruction, however, did not preclude development of plans and long-
range cost projections for specific programs requiring a long lead-time for
development. In this period, Apollo and Apollo extension programs provided the
main thrust for NASA, and it seemed to NASA senior administrators that the most
valuable contribution to be made in the planning area was to focus on the
short and medium-term. But, by early 1965, the need for long-range agency-
wide planning had been generally recognized. A considerable amount of effort
was then devoted to what was called the Future Programs Task Group, whose
report was submitted to President Johnson in February 1965.
The atmosphere in which the Future Programs Task Group operated
was characterized by a lively new interest in post-Apollo planning. Both
within NASA and in other agencies with related interests and especially in
industry groups involved in the space program, attention focused on the need
for planning the follow-on to Apollo. At this point in time there remained a
good deal of uncertainty concerning Apollo itself, how it would progress in
the years ahead, and whether it would meet projected schedules. For the most
part, however, attitudes were marked by a high level of confidence. But a
considerable degree of uncertainty about the future of the Apollo program
complicated the task of post-Apollo planning.
The series of successes scored by the Gemini program-reinforced the
sense of confidence in the United States space program. Ten launches, each
involving two astronauts, contributed to this confidence. The Russian manned
space program, on the other hand, while it continued to be active, featured
fewer manned flights with relatively longer gaps between launches. The official
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position of NASA, reflected in attitudes permeating the agency, was that
the mission of a manned lunar landing was merely thebeginning of a national
space program whose long-term objectives encompassed broader and.more ambitious
goals. It was assumed that achievement of these goals would require further
expansion of the space program as a whole.
As increased attention was focused on looking ahead, however, it
became clear that formulating and obtaining agreement upon future plans would
present some very difficult problems. It was evident that approved programs
were running out. Initiating new program starts was not going to be as easy
as had been generally assumed earlier.
The accumulated experience of NASA up to the mid-sixties indicated
that there was a considerable range of new space activity opening up for
potential development, including the orbiting space station, the space shuttle,
manned exploration of deep space, extended lunar explorations, and orbiting
astronomical observatories. Any one of these undertakings would require extended
effort in planning, budgeting, and conducting the program. Any one would
involve a large-scale expenditure over a period of years. Selling any one
of these ideas was a far more difficult job than NASA had encountered in
obtaining support for Apollo and other pre-Apollo programs.
Upon submission to the President of the'Summary'Report of the
Future Programs Task Group early in 1965, Webb. recommended that the document
be made public in order to facilitate a national debate on what the United
States should do in the post-Apollo era. .lhen released, the report helped to
meet the need for a standard agency posture on what future programs might
be. The report defined the various kinds of activity that could be undertaken
and the kind of technology needed in each case. However, it was subsequently
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criticized for what was called a somewhat "bland" quality and for the lack of
a range of program mixes into various alternative plans for adoption by the
agency.
In President Johnson's 1965 budget message to Congress,- only two
new program starts were recommended. One was the Voyager, a new unmanned
spacecraft designed to explore the planet Mars. The second was a request for
funding of the Apollo extension system designed to study how NASA would use
the capability developed through Saturn and Apollo. Although Congressional
hearings on this budget request evoked some questions concerning what NASA
had developed in the way of hard plans for future programs, the NASA
authorization and appropriation bills came close to the President's request.
The nature of NASA's future planning at this time was dictated by
the strategy adopted by Webb. Within NASA a great deal of the planning effort
had centered on new programs which were completely unrelated to Apollo. Webb
and his principal associates were concerned about the possible unfavorable
impression that would be created in Congress and the public if NASA were to
submit a long-range plan concentrating on new programs without fully exploiting
the range of capabilities developed at great cost in Apollo. Although there
was widespread belief within the agency that NASA was in a good position to
advance a single long-range plan for the future, the three senior administrators
were reluctant to present to Congress a monolithic plan which could become
a target for those wishing to cut back the space program. In all likelihood,
the Senate and House space committees would both have endorsed such a plan,
but it was questionable whether either of the two houses would have passed
legislation based on a more specific plan than that offered by the Future Programs
Task Group. In any event, the decision at the time was not to advance a single
long-range plan.
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By early 1965, NASA planners had become increasingly aware of the
long lead-time required to move from theplanning stage into-the actual start
of a program. Concurrently, there was an increasing recognition of the
importance of working out a system within the agency for holding the planning
of the several programs together. The Planning Coordination Steering Group
was established with the full endorsement of NASA senior management to help
meet this need. It consisted of the top management of each of the Headquarters
program offices. It was supported by a series of working groups, operating on
a more or less continuous basis, which examined the progress of on-going
programs and the planning of new programs. Although it operated somewhat
informally at the outset, it served as a useful stepping stone to the kinds
of planning machinery which were adopted in the sixties.
In the 1965-66 time frame, NASA undertook several efforts to create
a greater cohesiveness throughout the agency by relating current and immediate-
term future plans to long-range planning and by drawing the Headquarters program
offices and their associated field centers closer together with the above
mentioned planning coordination machinery. In the Office of Advanced Research
and Technology (OART), for example, an advanced research and technology board
was set up consisting of all the center directors plus the Associate and
Deputy Associate Administrators of OART. The board's function was to review
the progress of current programs while also overseeing near-term and long-
term planning. Similar functions were performed by a senior council in the
Office of Space Science and Applications and by a planning council in the
Office of Manned Space Flight. These groups were very active during 1965 and
1966 and contributed towards a more effective meshing of the on-going NASA
program activities and the several planning efforts.
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During 1967, the planning machinery was further developed into a
more ,formal and elaborate system which, by 1968, was officially designated
"The NASA Planning System.
"
1 3 It provided a procedure for "(a) developing
plans, programs and budgets for consideration by NASA Management for internal
planning purposes and (b) developing data and information required for NASA's
annual submissions to the Bureau of the Budget..."
As one seminar participant pointed out,
The Planning Steering Group is organically fitted to the line
organization so as to draw line and staff together in the accomplish-.
ment of their jobs. It is managed so as to preserve the important
differences of the line and staff, however. This is not just a
homogenization of the two, but rather again a recognition that
line and staff have to work together. Staff has a critiquing
function and the line has an operating function, and these
must not be compromised. Critiquing does not mean finger-
pointing but rather offering assistance, providing another point
of view, and assuring that things don't fall between cracks.
The goal of the NASA Planning System was to expose a range of
alternative possibilities and to develop a total perspective for top
management -- not to set a course which would have to be followed without
deviation. The process was intended as a means of facilitating top management's
forward planning and allocation of resources. Discussion in the seminar raised
a number of serious questions about the utility of the system.
Perhaps the most serious reservations expressed about the System
concerned the issue of how much of a real impact the planning process actually
had on decision-making by top management. Some participants expressed the
view that planning had become a somewhat isolated function and that the top
levels of management in Headquarters and in the field centers based decisions
affecting the long-range future on other considerations than the plans emerging
from the planning process.
13. Memorandum, NASA Planning System, September 11, 1968.
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One of the constraints upon the System stemmed from the fact that
each Working Group was required to operate within the limits of proposed
budget ceilings for the coming year. The possibility of significant new
departures in future plans was limited by the need to accommodate on-going
programs and the availability of only small incremental funds for major new
starts. More often than not the process culminated in proposals for increases
or decreases of no more than five percent in existing programs. It was pointed
out, however, that this is a common problem in all planning activity.
Another problem within NASA affecting the planning process is the
highly independent role of the field centers. It was pointed out that the
extent of decentralization of the NASA centers is greater than found in any
other government agency, with the possible exception of the Atomic Energy
Commission. The centers' inputs into the planning process must be closely
in line with the thinking of top center management. This places a premium on
the active participation of center directors in the planning system.
A very different kind of administrative environment began to prevail
in the late sixties. It had been a fairly straightforward matter to relate
the Headquarters and field centers when they were all working towards fulfillment
of clearly defined and well accepted objectives. But it became more difficult
to maintain effective relationships when future goals of the space program
were being deliberated and a good deal of uncertainty replaced the earlier
clarity of mission. Furthermore, in the first half of the sixties, NASA was
a rapidly expanding organization whose future seemed to promise even more
growth potential. It was one thing to manage such an organization, whether at
Headquarters or in the field, and quite another to manage an organization facing
declining levels of support.
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In effect, this is what NASA and its field centers have been facing
in the years since fiscal 1966. From fy 1966 to fy 1970, NASA's annual budget
dropped from $5.175 to $3.7 billion and its manpower fell from nearly 34,000
to around 30,000. During these years, it became increasingly critical for most
of the field centers to develop new alternative uses to absorb excess capacity.
NASA increasingly confronted the difficult task of matching workload
with capability in the field centers. Centers tended to bid for more work out-
side of their historical area of expertise than in the past. This, in turn,
blured the distinctions between the centers. As a result of centers bidding
for new work, decisions were forced about shifting workload to keep the centers
in balance. One seminar participant noted that, "There are serious dangers in
a situation in which the centers have more capability than work to go around
and are bidding against one another. There is a risk that the centers will
appear to be competing without reference to agency goals or national objectives."
The critical question posed at that point in time was whether the space agency
could survive in the changing market situation after the men returned from
the moon. One key to survival was seen to lie in pulling work back from in-
dustrial contractors and placing it in the centers.
A seminar participant commented that, while the idea of bringing
work back from the contractors to the centers deserved thorough consideration,
the situation of the centers was complex and difficult to resolve. The centers
which faced problems in retaining capability and adequate workload were, to a
large extent, those concerned with manufacturing large missiles. With the
Apollo program well developed and with no big missiles to design, build,
test, and launch, these centers faced serious difficulties. They were limited
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in the extent to which they could divert personnel from the Apollo program.
Nor was there work that could be brought in from the contractors. They
were not able to undertake new work. But, when Apollo ends, their staff
would be surplus and there would be no work for those centers to perform.
The remainder of the centers -- those concerned with non-manned and aero-
nautics projects -- were not in such severe difficulty.
Maintaining Organizational Vitality. One of the principal recurring
themes of the last four seminar discussions was the question of organizational
vitality and the effect upon NASA of the aging process. The discussion did not
lead to any clear conclusions and there was no consensus on such issues as
whether such loss of dynamism as had occurred was the inevitable consequence
of the passage of time. No one questioned that there was, in the post-Apollo
era, a great deal less dynamism than in the previous period. Nor was there
much doubt expressed that NASA had lost something of value in the diminution
of the kind of adventuresome spirit which had characterized the agency in the
early Sixties. Among the most serious effects, it was suggested, was a
tendency on the part of operational elements within the agency to limit the
scope of future undertakings to activities which were not too difficult of
accomplishment. Rather than accepting the kind of challenge represented by
Apollo, the temptation was to trim down to less ambitious objectives with
smaller resource requirements.
A number of explanations were advanced for the change in character of
the agency. Some pointed out that this kind of change takes place in all
government organizations after a certain period of years, usually somewhere
between the fifth and tenth year. In the early years of an organization,
administration and operation have not come under the control of bureaucracy.
- 65 -
Individuals operate relatively freely and without the constraints of multiple
reporting systems and clearance procedures. Business is accomplished quickly
and informally through person to person interchange. There are fewer
clearance points and committees to be consulted in the decision-making process.
Decisions are not submitted to as many reviews by higher levels. The aging
process, however, usually entails an overlayering of management, the building
of a hierarchical structure of decision-making, and an institutional inertia
which reduces the vitality of any public agency.
Another hypothesis advanced in the discussions was that, after its
first five to six years, NASA experienced the effects of elimination of
ultimate unknowns. In any new scientific enterprise, the first years are a
period in which bold imagination can lead to high expectation. With time, the
limits of near and medium-term scientific exploration begin to be defined. So,
in the case of NASA, time produced a clearer picture of what could and
could not be accomplished in space exploration given the limits of manpower
and budgetary resources. The willingness to accept the challenge of:pushing
out the frontiers of knowledge and seeking breakthroughs in man's understanding
of his universe falls off as those engaged in an endeavor become attuned to
what is feasible and practical.
Another way of looking at this same question is to consider the
willingness of an agency to discontinue areas of endeavor with limited potential
reward. It becomes difficult to obtain consensus on terminating an activity
which has been initiated and involves an investment of time and money. Once
a multi-million dollar program becomes institutionalized, even though all
concerned recognize that it is approaching the point of diminishing returns,
it becomes difficult-to terminate the program. Such programs tend to gather
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a certain amount of internal inertia which does not yield readily to outside
forces. It was suggested that, to some extent, real organizational dynamism
is the capability to single out the most rewarding avenues for future activity
and to turn off unpromising undertakings without excessive deliberation.
Checks and Balances. In the period following the Apollo fire,
Webb sought to improve the decision-making process through several means,
including a system of checks and balances for monitoring major areas of agency
activity and better self-policing of the implementation of decisions. The
discussion of these various moves revolved'around the issue of whether they
tended to make for better decision-making or whether they reduced the effective-
ness of the decision-making process by overloading it with controls.
It was noted, for example, that a good system of checks and balances
can serve the interests of the'agency and individual managers but that "there
is a delicate line between constructive and destructive checks and balances."
Useful "conflict," it was noted, can be achieved through structured discussion
among peers. This process ideally results in a situation in which each higher level
of responsibility or authority can rely on the work of-those at the next rung
down the ladder with confidence in the integrity of their decision-making.
When this faith appears to be no longer justified, when the self-policing mechanism
seems no longer to be working, there is the temptation to set up new and
complementary systems of checks and balances. This duplicating or overlapping
of action or line assignments can result in kinds of conflict which may be
costly and counter productive. The effort to enforce effective self-policing
in the 1967-68 period resulted in a somewhat hardened structure which over-
checked and overbalanced. Thus, as one of the seminar participants noted:
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I have been amazed at the relatively few things that can be done
by a single individual as his sole responsibility. There are cross
checks built into the organization in such a way that I get the
feeling that it was hoped that if this guy didn't do it, that guy
would, because it wasn't a divided responsibility. It was almost a
dual responsibility.
One of the principal dilemmas of management is to find the right
mix of delegation and internal checking. Too much delegation without
adequate checks can lead to loss of control and potentially poor performance.
Limited delegation and excessive checks make the machinery of administration
move so cautiously and laboriously that it loses much of its potential.
A good example of how NASA has applied the checks and balance system
for self-policing is in the monitoring of contractors. As one of the
participants noted, NASA monitoring allows a contractor considerable freedom.
For the most part, he can do just about whatever he wants to. Ordinarily,
NASA does- not require on-site location of its monitoring teams nor a one-to-one
match of in-house to contractor managers. The contractor does not have the
feeling that he is being watched every minute of every day, but he is aware
that NASA representatives will not hesitate to challenge any decision or action
of which they disapprove. A key point in effective monitoring is the requirement
that the information system checking the line operation must be an open and
structured arrangement rather than a covert or Gestapo-type mechanism. This
concept was violated when the Executive Secretariat was given the mission of
gathering data and feeding it into the top decision-making levels of NASA
without keeping the line organization informed. Although the line offices had
the expertise, knowledge and ability to assemble and disseminate data, they
were by-passed by the Executive Secretariat whose assignment was to penetrate
the line structure. One participant contended that this arrangement could have
worked if it had been an open proposition with the Secretariat making its
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reports available for review by line officers before they were formally submitted
to senior management. He expressed the view that both line and staff "have to
have the opportunity to get to the heart of the matter" so that all data points are
consulted and that total reliance is not placed on the line or on the staff.
The kind of line-staff problem which developed in NASA has appeared
in many other federal agencies. In this situation, top management, in effect,
becomes the prisoner of its staff organization. The latter not only develops
its own network of information reporting but also takes on a decision-making
role. On the side of the line organization, the withdrawal from full participa-
tion may result either from an insufficient delegation of responsibility or a
virtual abdication of line authority. In either case, line managers no longer
identify with the total agency mission. They lose the sense of commitment to
higher level decisions in which they have not fully participated. In the words
of the memorandum on management principles discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the
adverse effect of duplicate assignments where operational responsibility is
involved "'can be devastating, tending to confuse responsibility, introduce
divisiveness, attack morale, increase confusion inside and outside the agency,
and increase the work on some items while dropping others between the cracks."
One participant noted that, in the past, this lesson has not been sufficiently
understood by various occupants of the White House and their staffs.
One of the major sources of trouble in line-staff relationships occurs
when the staff group chooses to operate, or is forced to operate, off to one
side. If staff groups try to make themselves look good simply by pointing
out to top management the mistakes being made by line offices, they are not
fulfilling their supporting role. Staff and line find themselves at logger-
heads and the whole system breaks down. This does not mean that staff personnel
must necessarily agree with line operators on every issue. There is obviously
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room for legitimate differences of opinion. What matters is the degree of
respect that the line develops for staff. This, in turn, depends on both
the technical competence and the methods of operating of the staff personnel.
One participant expressed the view that, despite some legitimate
differences arising between the line and staff, most of the traffic between
the two should produce agreement. Difficulties are likely to trace back to
incompetence on one side or the other, in which case the only resource is
removal of the incompetent.
Related to the issue of the staff-line relationship was the seminar
discussion of the principle of economy of effort. The discussion dealt with
the question of how much duplication and overlap of assignments is desirable
and productive in an organization. While there was some agreement that a manager
needs to consult a variety of sources and to obtain different opinions before
reaching technical decisions, it was also agreed that a conscious policy of
multiple or overlapping assignments can be counter productive. A policy
based on distrust or suspicion bymaking covert assignments to different
people is likely to wind up with friction and low morale.
These were the kinds of issues with which NASA administrators
were wrestling as the Academy seminar series drew to a close in April 1969.
Although events have overtaken some of the concerns of the seminar parti-
cipants at that time, many of the problems remain, albeit in a modified
form, today. Those who were laying plans for the future of the space pro-
gram in the Spring of 1969 could not have perceived many of the significant
changes in the external environment in which NASA was to operate.
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